Development aid as an economic factor in the United Nations Security Council election: Lessons for Latvia
Keywords: Security Council, non-permanent members, election, development aid
Language: In English

Increase in the amount of development aid to United Nations’ member states is widely seen as a method in securing the vote of developing countries in the elections for the nonpermanent member seat of the Security Council, which is the most powerful institution in the sphere of global peace and security. Latvia has put forward its candidature to the nonpermanent seat of the Security Council for the term 2026–2027 at the election in 2025, and an increase in the amount of Latvia’s development assistance has also been officially mentioned as one of the most important success factors in the elections. This article tests the aforementioned assumption in political behaviour and aims to determine whether the amount of the development aid correlates with success in elections and therefore can be regarded as an economic influence factor. Specifically, the study used a discrete choice model to analyse the data of the Security Council elections of the past ten years and the dynamics of development assistance amounts provided for less developed United Nations’ member states by both elected and non-elected candidates. The results suggest that the widely accepted assumption is wrong. Although a candidate country’s activities in providing development aid might be regarded as a factor indicating the country’s level of integration in United Nations’ work and values, development aid does not correlate with the election results in the Security Council and is not a variable having a significant effect on the election results.